In this movie, a lot of things come together. People: familiar faces from Georgia (read: Tbilisi), South Ossetia, Abkhazia but also Moscow, and others I whom I would very much like to meet one day. Places: Georgia, in different moments and from different angles; Istanbul; and … no, not Abkhazia or South Ossetia, because this was a movie by a Georgian filmmaker who did not get access to these places, but still tried to construct a balanced story where voices from all sides have a chance to tell their truth (this upon request, as Mamuka explained, of the Georgian public, which unfortunately for a large part had difficulties understanding his previous movie “Absence of Will”, that looked into the Georgian side of the story and asked some tough questions about its behaviour). Stories: from the passportisation issue via refugees and property, to the fate of “Absence of Will” and especially its reception in Abkhazia, and of course the war of August 2008 with its “before” and “after”. A caleidoscope of narratives that triggered a lot of interesting thoughts – as the ensuing discussion with the audience (of students, journalists, NGO people working with the Caucasus and a few “just interested”) demonstrated.

One episode struck me deeply and stayed behind as an image of all the wasted chances, missed opportunities and unfortunate rhetoric that have characterised Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian relations over the past two decades. It was a commercial commissioned by the Georgian government and screened on Georgian TV – as Mamuka told me, one out of a series of five. I am retelling it now from memory, so the wording may not correspond exactly to the original, but this is what I saw: A little boy, 5 or 6 years old, together with his grandfather enters a museum. There, they see a long, mighty sword, and the grandfather tells: “My grandson! In my time, I spoke a ruthless language with our enemies, I had no mercy for them. And you, when you grow up, you should also speak a ruthless language with our enemies, you should hit them hard…” Upon which the commercial turns into a propaganda add for the Georgian army, with smart, well-clad soldiers running through a field, helicopters circling above their heads, tanks, everything looking smooth and stout and very professional. “Brainwashing” is the word a young Georgian journalist who volunteered for the army in August 2008 (also interviewed in Mamuka’s movie) is using, and it is the only word that comes to my mind after mentally watching this add again and again – after a long astounded silence, filled with indignation: how can one use a child for suh a purpose, and then show it on national TV, where no doubt other children will have watched it?!

The beginning looked so good, and there was a real chance to learn from previous mistakes and break through the circle of violence. What if the grandfather would have said: “My grandson! In my time, I spoke a ruthless language with our enemies, I had no mercy for them. But you, you should learn how to speak a different language to them: a language of mutual respect and understanding. You should learn to fight out your differences with words, not swords, and build a country where the interests of all and each have their own, legitimate place…”

Even if this is the type of language for which soon interpreters will be needed, as the younger generations learn mainly Georgian and English on one side, and Russian and Ossetian or Abkhaz on the other - only this new language will lead to mutual understanding…

(“What language to speak” is a repost from Cinta’s blog “Caucasus Dialogues”)

Ik was in Nagorno Karabach om onze projecten te bezoeken en te spreken met vredesactivisten, politici en burgers.

Het boek, geschreven door Galichian, beschuldigt Azerbeidzjan van geschiedvervalsing en van oorlogsmisdaden. Voor zover ik het kan overzien berust deze stellingname grotendeels op waarheid, maar vertelt het tegelijk maar de halve waarheid: ook Armenië zelf heeft zich hier namelijk schuldig aan gemaakt.

De gehele waarheid is moeilijk te achterhalen, beide kanten blijven richting hun bevolking en de internationale gemeenschap druk bezig hun eigen gelijk te halen. Geschiedenis, jaartallen, aantallen slachtoffers en zo meer vliegen je om de oren ter verdediging van dit eigen gelijk. Ze vormen daarmee een rechtvaardiging voor de compromisloze houding die al twintig jaar tot een bevroren conflict leidt in deze regio.

Op bezoek in de enclave realiseer ik me hoe uitzichtloos de situatie van de ‘bevrijde’ bevolking is. Je zult maar bevrijd worden en vervolgens gevangen zitten in een enclave die je niet anders kunt verlaten dan via een besneeuwde bergpas. Een enclave waar de Karabachi burgers worden betaald om er in te blijven wonen. Het is ook een enclave waarin de burgers zich dagelijks bedreigd voelen door Azerbeidzjan, dat aankondigt het grondgebeid op korte termijn terug te veroveren en daartoe de helft van zijn begroting besteedt aan wapentuig.

Het is ook een enclave waarin de burgers zich verraden voelen door de Armeense regering en hun eigen politici die het conflict gebruiken om een soort noodtoestand te handhaven waarbinnen zij boven de wet staan. De corruptie tiert dan ook welig. Een oplossing voor het conflict kan dus tot groot verlies voor vele corruptie politici en zakenlieden leiden.

Lokale activisten roepen op tot ‘echte bevrijding’ maar dan zonder geweld. Zij doen een beroep op de internationale gemeenschap om hen onafhankelijkheid te geven, net zoals Kosovo. De oproep wordt niet gehonoreerd en door Armenië noch Azerbeidzjan gewaardeerd.

Onder de activisten zijn veel jongeren. Zij willen niet langer leven onder de dreiging van geweld, gevangen in de geschiedenis. Zij verlangen naar een toekomst in vrijheid. Daartoe leggen zij contacten met jongeren elders op de wereld, ook met hen die hun vijanden heten te zijn; vredesactivisten 3.0 o.a. via Facebook en Twitter. Met hoop kijken zij naar de ontwikkelingen in het voor hen zo nabije Midden-Oosten; ontwikkelingen die door hun politieke leiders met argusogen worden gevolgd en eerder tot meer onderdrukking leiden.

Het grootste probleem van Armenië, zo vertellen die politieke leiders mij, is de migratie. Veel jongeren willen weg uit dit land. Ik kan me dat goed voorstellen: ontsnappen uit een gevangenis die vrijheid heet.

Terugkijkend lijkt het aardig te kloppen wat mijn toenmalige docenten aan het Oost-Europa Instituut van de Universiteit van Amsterdam in 1991 voorspelden: het gaat iets langer duren dan we denken voordat alles (weer) enigszins normaal is: waarschijnlijk tenminste een hele generatie.

De afgelopen twintig jaar doorliep de regio het traject van absolute chaos ((burger-)oorlogen, economische ineenstorting, armoedeval) naar voorzichtig herstel (stabilisatie, economische groei en groeiende middenklasse). Maar de regio bewoog zich ook van relatieve vrijheid en chaotische democratie, naar weer afnemende vrijheid en toenemende repressie.  

De zuidelijke Kaukasus heeft verschillende crises doorgemaakt: burgeroorlogen, oorlogen om Nagorno Karabakh, Zuid-Ossetië en Abchazië (met als resultaat drie niet – of nauwelijks erkende landen) en volksopstanden in Georgië (geslaagd), Azerbeidzjan  (mislukt) en Armenië (mislukt, maar nog niet helemaal gesmoord). Daar staat tegenover dat Azerbeidzjan zich zeer snel economisch aan het ontwikkelen is door haar olie- en gasinkomsten, Georgië zich als eerste land geheel op het Westen gericht heeft en daar nu economisch en politiek de vruchten van begint te plukken en Armenië zich ondanks de economische blokkade van Azerbaijan en Turkije eveneens uit de chaos en economische uitzichtloosheid ontworsteld heeft.  

Anno 2011 is de balans dat het economische beter gaat dan in de jaren negentig, maar dat duurzame stabiliteit nog ver te zoeken is. De welvaart is zeer oneerlijk verdeeld waardoor er een grote kloof is tussen zeer arm en zeer rijk. De conflicten in de regio zijn op zijn best bevroren, op zijn slechtst licht ontvlambaar. De relaties met de buurlanden vaak ronduit slecht. De militaire uitgaven zijn hoger dan de uitgaven aan zorg of onderwijs. De politieke oppositie kan nauwelijks nog een vuist maken in de politieke systemen die gedomineerd worden door één heersende partij en civil society en onafhankelijke media zijn nog steeds zwak ontwikkeld en worden nog steeds actief tegengewerkt.

Europa is nog steeds een tandeloze tijger waarvan heel veel  verwacht wordt, maar die geen serieuze moeite doet om de regio binnen haar normen- en waardeninvloedsfeer te brengen. Ook de Verenigde Staten lijken het steeds meer af te laten weten. De echte strijd om invloed in de regio gaat nu tussen Rusland (actief bezig de relaties met de voormalige Sovjetrepublieken te herstellen of te versterken), Turkije (ambieert een  rol as regionale grootmacht) en Iran (probeert het internationale isolement te doorbreken).

We zijn nu ongeveer halverwege een generatie. Hoewel het nog steeds alle kanten op kan gaan in de Kaukasus, wijst er maar weinig op dat de regio zich een kant op beweegt die wij in het westen graag zouden zien. Ik ben benieuwd hoe de regio er over twintig jaar uitziet, maar ik ben niet optimistisch.

When my colleagues and I were in Brussels earlier this month, talking to EU officials, we were also told that the Georgian government was committed to making this a really neutral document. What would make it so neutral, I didn’t fully understand. It won’t carry any name or symbols relating to the Georgian state (or, according to some reports, it will even have elements of these) or confer Georgian citizenship onto its bearers – this all seems pretty obvious (otherwise there would be no reason at all to call the document ‘neutral’). But what will be written in the place of the three-letter country code we all have in our passports? GEO? ABK/SOS? something else? (I like the SOS code… but that’s being ironic). Certainly there will be something relating to Georgia in the documents, as it is Georgia that has taken responsibility for readmission of persons carrying this document and overstaying their visa in third countries. If we just think of the possibility of such a thing happening, it not only means Georgia considers the bearer of this document as its citizen (which it does, and in a way quite understandably so), but also that this person would be ‘repatriated’ to Tbilisi – where he/she didn’t leave from or probably ever wanted to go to, and certainly wouldn’t feel home or repatriated…

The idea of a neutral travel document is not new: it has been used in Kosovo, where UNMIK issued its own travel documents from 2000 to 2008 (when Kosovo started issuing its own passports). And there was talk, back then, of a similar solution (i.e. some kind of UN or other neutral authority issued document) for Abkhazia – which was rejected by the Georgian authorities. And so this stayed the only travel document the UN has ever been issuing (except its own laissez-passer), and Abkhaz analysts and politicians have been commenting the current Georgian initiative is too late and too little and not demanded by anyone in their society. They have been asking, too: why would anyone in Abkhazia or South Ossetia want to take a travel document from a state most people living there feel at the moment they’d rather not have anything to do with, whereas most people already have double documents: their own passports, on which they can only travel to Russia (handy), Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru (not very relevant to most people), and Russian passports which are used for travel to other countries. Adding another travel document does not, even from a purely pragmatic point of view, make much sense for most of the people this initiative is targeting.

Besides, the new travel document is likely to face similar problems to the UNMIK travel document or the also existing world passport (issued mainly to refugees by an NGO, and not carrying any signs of state affiliation): because of its non-state, non-passport status, it is likely that quite a number of states will not recognise it as a valid travel document – the world passport, for example, does not grant access to EU countries, the US or Russia. And this is exactly the only thing that could make possession of such a document pragmatically worthwhile for people living in Abkhazia or South Ossetia in the current context: wide acceptance of the document (a part from the EU and US it would need at least Turkey to accept it, too) and ease of obtaining visas for its holder. To me, it is still a large question mark if the Georgian state will manage to achieve this.

So far, what I like most about the whole project is the willingness of the Georgian authorities to de-criminalise access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia via Russia – for holders of the ‘neutral document’. Though the idea that people will notify Tbilisi in advance of any such border crossings sounds, again, more like powerless wishful thinking than like anything else. If the Georgian government genuinely wants to reach out to the people living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, things need to be easy, attractive and without any hint of a wish to control…

After the Sochi Summit of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents on March 5 initiated by the president of Russia, and despite the achieved agreements and the announcements about launching investigations into recent violations of the 1994 cease fire along the line of contact, the context over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflicting region did not change. Actually, both Armenia and Azerbaijan refused to withdraw their snipers from the border, although the number of fatal incidents at the contact line has been critically increased from the beginning of 2011. Furthermore, in the same period of time Azerbaijan declared its militant attitude towards the opening of an airport in Stepanakert and Armenia responded with an announcement that the Armenian army command has decided to hold reserve drills on a more consistent basis and will be also more intensive than in the past and even more, the Defense Ministry declared that  Armenia acquired “unprecedented” quantities of modern weaponry last year and will continue the military build-up in 2011.

The next round of the negotiations between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan and their Russian counterpart is expected to be held in the Russian city Kazan on June 25. What are the expectations of the Armenian society from the upcoming meeting in Kazan and what processes take place in connection with this matter? What is the Armenian community getting ready for and what should it get ready for? To answer all these questions it’s necessary to find out what the society knows about the process at the moment.

Today the Armenian media is full of materials which tell about the expectations of the Co-Chairs of the Minsk group from the upcoming meeting in Kazan. According to B. Fassier the French Co-Chair of OSCE Minsk Group, the mediators expect the parties to “consolidate the progress in a written form in the nearest future.” In addition to this, it’s considered that the parties have come to agreement on several basic principles. The basic principles were first formally presented to Armenia and Azerbaijan in Madrid in late 2007. Since they have undergone several modifications aimed at making them more acceptable to both sides. The document calls for a gradual settlement that would start with the liberation of Azerbaijani districts around Karabakh that were occupied by Karabakh Armenian forces during the 1991-1994 war. In return, the dispute territory’s predominantly Armenian population would be able to determine its final status in a future referendum. The conflicting parties have disagreed on some crucial details of this peace framework, which are still not made public by the mediators. Fasier said the breakthrough did not materialize because Armenia rejected a modified version of the basic principles in early 2010. He added that chances of an Armenian-Azerbaijani peace deal again increased after Presidents Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliyev made “some progress“ at their last meeting held in the Russian city of Sochi last March.

Practically, any publication, article or reportage, either in printed or in electronic media, referring to the topic of the regulation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, contains the phrase “Armenia is exclusively for peaceful regulation of the conflict”. A phrase which is crucial and comprehensive on the one hand, but on the other hand, being continually repeated or compared with the mentioned in the previous paragraphs, it loses its entire contents and becomes trite /dull/ wordplay.

Another phrase that is continually voiced by mass media with the links to the top officials of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, the international and national politicians and experts, is “the regulation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be based on compromises”. What compromises is the society of Armenia or Nagorno-Karabakh ready for? No one has given an intelligible or a clear response to these questions yet. Although the concessions have been clearly announced for which neither Armenia nor, especially, the Karabakh side will go in any case, this is the so-called ”peace in exchange for territories” and “matter of the special status of Nagorno-Karabakh.”

“Already for two decades our country has existed as an independent country which does not threaten any of the neighboring countries. Today the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the most stable countries not only in the region, but also in the whole post-soviet area. The conflict with Azerbaijan could be solved only in one way – in the case of legal recognition of the independent Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh at the international level. This is the opinion of both the nation and the officials of our republic”, announces in his interview Bako Sahakyan, the president of Nagorno-Karabakh. At the same time he underlines that serious disagreements between Stepanakert and Yerevan in the tactics of negotiation does not exist, adding that it’s impossible to solve the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict without the direct involvement of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.

In addition to this, the political elite both in Armenia and in Karabakh calm down the society in connection with the possible risk of resumption of full-scale hostilities. In May Seyran Ohanyan, the Minister of Defense of Armenia, announced that in the case of aggression Armenia expects to meet the obligations by their CSTO partners. In his turn, Andrey Tretyak, the supernal representative of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, assured that in the case of such turn of events Russia will fulfill its obligations under the contract, i.e. it will hurry to defend its ally in the CSTO.

The next interesting phenomenon that may be encountered when trying to figure out what Armenian society should expect from the forthcoming meeting in Kazan is the fact that there exist two different categories of information – the first one is internal, got by an ordinary citizen of Armenia on television, from printed media in Armenian or Russian languages, and the other is “politically correct information”, which is published by the mass media for the English-speaking readers. One can often face the fact that the same article in English and Armenian languages ​​touches upon different aspects of the regulation of the Karabakh problem. The fact of the debate on the entry of peacekeeping forces in the zone of the Karabakh conflict for some time was not touched upon the national press and was spread mostly due to the international press and the information of the Azerbaijani mass media that affected the issue. Further, the Armenian press mentioned this fact only in the English versions of their publications. At the same time the political leaders, reacting to this fact, emphasized that they considered it as a secondary and ineffective for the negotiations in this phase. There is a fear among the society that, like the press, political leaders also express refuting statements in front of the negotiating table and their own society.

Comparing the facts that are currently under the disposal of the Armenian community, it can be considered that Kazan is not perceived so much as an expectation of something new, but even more, a fear of the unknown, fear of losing what is already achieved. For the society the question is like this: what will have, or vice versa, what can lose Armenia (Karabakh) in the case of the successful progress of the negotiations?

• Peace? At least some, but there is. Besides, Russia will prevent any aggravation of the situation.
• Status? What is the status of Nagorno Karabakh for the international community and what will bring this vision?
• What the symbolism of Kazan hides in itself, a region which has a comparatively “special” autonomy within Russia…
• How will the Azerbaijani party behave itself? What will be its further requirements and isn’t it a trap made against Armenians by the world?
• Why do the Armenians have to return the territories which were defended with the price of the lives of our brothers and fathers, in the war which was started not by the Armenians and on the territory historically belonging to Armenia?
• Who are the peacekeeping forces and what do they have to do in our region? They have already brought not a few troubles in other conflicting zones, do they?

This is not the full list of problems, worrying the ordinary citizens of Armenia today. The situation is more pumped by intra-political conflicts that exist in a society where the parties rush to accuse each other of political illiteracy and the near failure of the matter in the interest of the nation.

The existing fears, lack of trust towards the officials, lack of more or less intelligible answers to the existing questions and complete absence of democratic debate on the matter of regulation of the Karabakh conflict within the community, continual blowing of the enemy image of the mass media, beginning from cartoons and entertaining programs and ending with soap operas and political analysis in news blocks have led to complete ignorance and mistrust in regard to the peaceful regulation of the conflict and, particularly, to its upcoming phase in Kazan.

For more information about Peace Dialogue, please check the website: www.peacedialogue.am

There are however some interesting developments. In May the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group issued a quite strong and clear statement. This statement is interesting for a couple of reasons: first of all it was signed by the three presidents of the countries acting as Co-Chairs: Medvedev, Sarkozy and Obama , and not their ambassadors who normally issue statements. Secondly, it states clearly that they are loosing their patience: “Further delay would only call into question the commitment of the sides to reach an agreement”.

Secondly, in different media high level representatives of both the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia were quoted that something may actually happen in Kazan.

From one of my partners in Armenia I heard that all this created a lot of rumors again in Armenia. And of course I heard the same from a friend in Azerbaijan. The main problem is that there is hardly any official reporting in their societies on the content of these negotiations. Both governments promise their societies not to accept anything less than the maximum in the negotiations: full independence of Nagorno Karabakh (Armenia’s position) or territorial integrity and ‘getting all our lands back’ (Azerbaijan’s position). So people with some brains rightfully think that there is something wrong here: or the presidents are not really negotiating at all, but just re-stating their demands over and over again, or the presidents are negotiating compromises, and therefore lying to the people.

The stakes in the current negotiations are actually quite clear. The negotiators aim to get agreement on the so called Basic Principles. These principles are what the name suggests they are: principles, not ready-made solutions. They more or less describe a process and deliberately leave some of the crucial issues open, such as “return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control” (how, when?), “interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh” (what does that mean?)  and the “future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh” (when, how?). In other words, even if both sides would accept these basic principles, it leaves enough space (and time) for further negotiations.

This has two consequences:

1) Yes, agreeing on the Basic Principles would be a sign of good will and bring some honesty in the discussions in the societies on the future resolution of the conflict on Nagorno Karabakh. It would show that in the end there will be a compromise and it will make clear that all sides will win some, but may also loose some.

2) No, peace cannot be planned. At most 25 June will be the start of something, not the end…

Waarom wil ik er dan toch iets over schrijven? Het interessante is dat Azerbeidzjan het songfestival gewonnen heeft. Azerbeidzjan, het land met de exotische naam, waarvan maar weinig mensen weten waar het precies ligt. Zelfs hier bij IKV Pax Christi komt het nog regelmatig voor dat mensen denken dat het in Centraal Azië ligt. “-dzjan” lijkt op “-stan”, lijkt op Oezbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan en dat is Centraal Azië. Grappig is trouwens dat Armenië zich zelf Hayastan noemt en daarvan weten de meeste mensen wel weer dat het in de Kaukasus ligt. Maar goed, ik dwaal af.

Azerbeidzjan heeft olie, gas en dus geld. Het heeft nog iets: een niet zo heel goede reputatie als het om mensenrechten en in het bijzonder de vrijheid van de media gaat. Minder een week voor de Azerische zegetocht ontving ik een persbericht van de Organisatie van Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa, de OVSE, waarin zij aanbiedt om Azerbeidzjan te helpen de mediavrijheid van het land te verbeteren. In een laatste zinnetje van dit persbericht wordt nog vermeld dat de OVSE-vertegenwoordiger ook Eynulla Fatullayev heeft bezocht – een journalist die al jaren onterecht gevangen zit vanwege kritiek op zijn overheid en zijn publicaties over Nagorno Karabach.

Maar ook dit is even besides the point. Direct na de overwinning van Azerbeidzjan ontstond er een discussie op Twitter en Facebook over Armeense deelname aan het songfestival als dat volgend jaar in Baku wordt georganiseerd. Armeniërs zijn namelijk al sinds de oorlog om Nagorno Karabach niet meer welkom in Azerbeidzjan. Een heel enkele keer gebeurt het nog wel, vooral als de overheid er internationaal publicitair mee denkt te winnen. Azerbeidjzan zal daarom waarschijnlijk ook nu zeggen dat de Armeense delegatie welkom is. De vraag is echter of ook de Armeense fans op een warm welkom kunnen rekenen…

Aan de andere kant gaan er ook in Armenië stemmen op om sowieso af te zien van deelname, omdat ze niet willen meewerken aan deze propagandamogelijkheid van Azerbeidzjan en omdat ze vrezen voor hun veiligheid in Baku.

En hier gaat het dus wel om: zelfs zoiets tamelijk onbelangrijks als het Eurovisie songfestival wordt politiek misbruikt om de haat tussen de twee volkeren te vergroten. En dat terwijl het festival juist apolitiek zou moeten zijn en mensen dichter bij elkaar zou moeten brengen.

Ik zie dus een schone taak weggelegd voor de leiding van het Eurovisie Songfestival. Ten eerste moeten ze er bij Armenië op aandringen dat ze gewoon meedoen in Baku. Ten tweede moeten ze Azerbeidzjan wijzen op hun verplichtingen als organisatoren om de veiligheid van iedereen te garanderen die meedoet aan het festival. Ze moeten Azerbeidzjan wijzen op de heel sterke traditie in de Kaukasus, hun belangrijkste unique selling point: de grenzeloze gastvrijheid.

Het Eurovisie Songfestival is uitermate populair in de Kaukasus. De fans in de regio zouden het daarom niet moeten pikken als hun leiders hun festival proberen te kapen voor politieke doeleinden. Het moet een feest worden, voor iedereen, maar vooral ook voor de hele Kaukasus. Azerbeidjzan heeft de kans om een enorme boost te geven aan hun internationale profiel en om te laten zien dat ze kan zijn wat ze wil zijn: naast een economische, ook een verantwoordelijke, (gast)vrije  en toekomstgerichte regionale factor van belang.

Misschien ga dan zelfs ik kijken volgend jaar.

Guido de Graaf Bierbrauwer, IKV Pax Christi